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TAXING TRADES: PROPOSALS TO KEEP
MONEYBALL OUT OF TAX LAW
Cody Wilson*
ABSTRACT
Ever since professional sports first captivated the hearts and minds of
American fans, team scouts have scoured the land for athletic talent. Upon
discovery, scouts must gauge the discovered player’s worth to their team,
which is done through both observation and statistical analysis commonly
known as “Moneyball.” However, as economists note, such valuation
methods often fall short. Nonetheless, following the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
of 2017 (TCJA), current tax laws require that Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) agents engage in the same player valuation conundrum to assess the
tax consequences of trades between teams.
Before the TCJA, § 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code allowed trades of
player contracts and future draft picks to go untaxed. Section 1031 allowed
this because such trades constituted a like-kind exchange, which prevented
any gain or loss from being recognized for tax purposes. Now, the TCJA
has limited the non-recognition treatment afforded by § 1031 to real prop-
erty, forcing IRS agents to ascertain the fair market value of player con-
tracts and future draft picks to assess the tax consequences of trades.
Adding to the conundrum facing the IRS, the Treasury Department has
created a safe harbor permitting teams to treat player contracts and future
draft picks as having a zero value for tax purposes; however, the Treasury
Department has not released guidance addressing how valuations are to
occur when teams avoid the safe harbor.
This article seeks to resolve the valuation conundrum by proposing the
reformation of current tax laws such that trades are taxed in the same man-
ner as before the TCJA. Congress may do so legislatively, or the Treasury
Department may do so through reliance on the open-transaction doctrine.
Not returning to the pre-TCJA manner of taxation is illogical for two rea-
sons. First, the IRS is not capable of measuring the value of player con-
tracts or future draft picks, making the administration of current tax laws
infeasible. Second, applying current tax laws to trades is likely to reduce tax
revenue because the current tax laws invite teams to reduce their tax liabili-
ties without fundamentally changing their economic position, a process
known as tax arbitrage.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2020; B.S., Industrial Engineering,
University of Oklahoma, 2014. Thank you to Professor Christopher H. Hanna and Profes-
sor Gregory S. Crespi for their invaluable guidance throughout the writing process; and a
special thank you to my wife, Amy, for her unconditional support in all of my endeavors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
EVER since professional sports first captivated the hearts andminds of American fans, team scouts have scoured the land forathletic talent.1 Professional sports are a business after all, and
1. See J.C. BRADBURY, HOT STOVE ECONOMICS 69 (2011). In 1871, baseball became
the first commercialized major league sport in the United States. David Q. Voigt, Reflec-
tions on Diamonds: American Baseball and American Culture, 1 J. SPORT HIST. 3, 8 (1974).
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team owners are keenly aware that fans prefer teams that win over those
that lose.2 Yet, contrary to what a coach may say, winning is not every-
thing.3 Profits matter too.4 Therefore, upon discovery, scouts must put a
“dollar sign on the muscle” to ensure that a player’s value to a team is
equal to or, even better, exceeds the compensation being offered for that
player’s services.5
Scouts traditionally made educated guesses about a player’s potential
value to a team through mere observation of a player’s talent.6 Over time,
the reliance on mere observation has faded away, and many teams have
adopted the Moneyball method.7 The term “Moneyball,” taken from the
title of Michael Lewis’s bestseller, describes a team’s use of player per-
formance statistics to analyze and assess a player’s potential contribution
to the team.8 The benefits a team may gain from adopting the method is
perhaps best illustrated by the success of the Oakland Athletics, despite
their relatively small budget.9 However, Moneyball is imperfect, and
economists quickly noted that teams in the National Football League
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Associa-
tion (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League
Soccer (MLS) are bad at making player valuations.10
Nonetheless, following the revision of § 1031 of the Internal Revenue
Code (the Code) by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), current
tax laws require that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents engage in the
2. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 69; see also Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Eco-
nomics of Professional Sports: A Contribution to the Theory of the Firm in Sporting Com-
petition and in Market Competition, 78 Q.J. ECONOMICS 1, 2 (1964) (“The first peculiarity
of the economics of professional sports is that receipts depend upon competition among
the sportors or the teams . . . .”).
3. See Joel Sayre, He Flies on One Wing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 26, 1955, at 29,
48 (UCLA Bruin football coach Henry Sanders stated, “Sure, winning isn’t everything . . . .
It’s the only thing.”).
4. See Rodney Fort & James Quirk, Cross-Subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in
Professional Team Sports Leagues, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1265, 1266–67 (1995).
5. BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 69; see also PAUL DICKSON, THE DICKSON BASEBALL
DICTIONARY 262 (Skip McAfee ed., 3d ed. 2009) (defining “putting [a] dollar sign on the
muscle” to mean “[a] money code expressing an ultimate evaluation of a ballplayer,” and
noting “it is indeed a risky business to put the dollar mark on the individual muscle”).
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
3 (2004) (describing baseball scouts as carrying checklists for the five “tools” that should be
assessed in a baseball player: “the abilities to run, throw, field, hit, and hit with power”).
7. See id. at 17, 33–34; see also David Leonhardt, PRO BASKETBALL; Mavericks’
New Math May Be an Added Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/
2003/04/27/sports/pro-basketball-mavericks-new-math-may-be-an-added-edge.html [https://
perma.cc/UH7M-DMWC] (noting that the owner of the Dallas Mavericks, Mark Cuban,
purchased a player valuation method developed by a professor of decision sciences and a
professional sports statistician).
8. See Bill Gerrard, Is the Moneyball Approach Transferable to Complex Invasion
Team Sports?, 2 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 214, 214 (2007).
9. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 131–32.
10. DAVID J. BERRI ET AL., THE WAGES OF WINS 9–10, 92 (2006) (noting that “across
all the major North American sports, payroll and wins do not have a high correlation,” and
explaining that “it is entirely possible that mistakes are made when people in sports evalu-
ate player value”).
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same player valuation conundrum that continues to plague scouts.11
Before the TCJA, § 1031 allowed trades of player contracts and future
draft picks to go untaxed.12 Section 1031 allowed non-taxation because
such trades constituted a like-kind exchange, which prevented any gain or
loss from being recognized for tax purposes.13 While a benefit to teams,
this treatment also conveniently allowed IRS agents to avoid the arduous
task of ascertaining the fair market value of player contracts and future
draft picks.14 Now, the TCJA has limited the non-recognition treatment
afforded by § 1031 to real property.15 To add to the valuation conundrum
facing the IRS, the Department of the Treasury has created a safe harbor
permitting teams to treat player contracts and future draft picks as having
a zero value for tax purposes; however, the Treasury has not released
guidance addressing how valuations are to occur when teams avoid the
safe harbor.16
This article seeks to resolve the valuation conundrum by proposing the
reformation of current tax laws such that trades are taxed in the same
manner as before the TCJA. Congress may do so legislatively, or the
Treasury may do so through reliance on the open-transaction doctrine.
Not returning to the pre-TCJA manner of taxation is illogical for two
reasons. First, the IRS is not capable of measuring the value of player
contracts or future draft picks, making the administration of current tax
laws infeasible. Second, applying the current tax laws to trades is likely to
reduce tax revenue because the current tax laws invite teams to reduce
their tax liabilities without fundamentally changing their economic posi-
11. See Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13303, 131 Stat. 2054, 2123
(2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1031). Section 1031 states in relevant part: “No
gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of real property held for productive use in
a trade or business or for investment if such real property is exchanged solely for real
property of like kind . . . .” I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2017) (emphasis added).
12. Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104 (recognizing trades of football player contracts
as exchanges of like-kind property); Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291 (recognizing trades
of baseball player contracts as exchanges of like-kind property); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., MARKET SEGMENT SPECIALIZATION PROGRAM GUIDELINE: SPORTS FRANCHISES
ch. 12 (Aug. 1999), 1999 WL 1221150, at *72 [hereinafter IRS MSSP GUIDELINE] (IRS
treated player-for-draft-picks exchanges as like-kind). These rulings are assumed to apply
to the NBA, NHL, and MLS. See Joseph Mona, Amortization and Valuation of Intangibles:
The Tax Effect Upon Sports Franchises, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 162 n.27 (1978); How-
ard Zaritsky, Taxation of Professional Sports Teams After 1976: A Whole New Ballgame, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 696 (1977).
13. See Rev. Rul. 71-137, 171-1 C.B. 104.
14. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 13 (1934) (justifying the non-recognition treatment
for like-kind exchanges because, “[i]f all exchanges were made taxable, it would be neces-
sary to evaluate the property received in exchange in thousands of horse trades and similar
barter transactions each year”).
15. See id. at 22–23.
16. Rev. Proc. 2019-18, 2019-18 I.R.B. 1077 §1. But see Beate Erwin, A Fundamental
Change of the Professional Sports Landscape Under the 2017 U.S. Tax Reform? The End of
Like-Kind Exchanges for U.S. Sports Trades, 9 GLOBAL SPORTS L. & TAX’N REP. 49, 53
(2018); Jim Tankersley, A Curveball From the New Tax Law: It Makes Baseball Trades
Harder, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/politics/base
ball-tax-law-.html [Permalink unavailable].
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tion, a process known as tax arbitrage.17 These issues are exacerbated by
the planning opportunity presented through the zero-value safe harbor.18
Teams may exploit the safe harbor when it benefits them and avoid the
safe harbor when it does not.
To best understand these issues, Part II begins this article by explaining
the reason that player contracts and future draft picks are highly valued
intangible assets. Next, Part III discusses the tax implications of trading
such assets by first summarizing the relevant federal income tax laws. Part
III then explains the potential breadth of “gross income” and limits
placed on the term—such as by § 1031—in light of principles of equity,
efficiency, and administrability. Afterward, Part III offers a brief history
of § 1031 and the justification for the provision. Finally, Part III con-
cludes by describing the tax laws applicable to trades between teams,
both before and after the TCJA. Then, Part IV critiques the application
of current tax laws to trades. Specifically arguing that applying current
tax laws to trades is not administrable and invites teams to partake in tax
arbitrage, likely resulting in the collection of lower tax revenues because
of the TCJA. Part V presents two methods for resolving these issues, ei-
ther legislatively or through reliance on the open-transaction doctrine.
Finally, Part VI concludes this article.
II. PLAYER CONTRACTS AND FUTURE DRAFT PICKS
ARE VALUABLE ASSETS
For tax purposes, the Treasury Department views trading players and
future draft picks as trading intangible assets. Trading players amounts to
trading player contracts,19 which provides the team that holds the con-
tract the right to receive services from the player.20 Similarly, trading fu-
ture draft picks amounts to trading the right to future services from a
player.21 Both types of assets offer teams considerable value.
Teams attach great value to certain player contracts and future draft
picks because of the unique economies that exist in each professional
sports league.22 Player contracts create value for a team when the reve-
nue generated by the player exceeds the player’s employment costs.23 Fu-
ture draft picks create value for a team because they provide the holding
team with the sole right to contract with the drafted player.24 In a free
17. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1189, 1244 (1989).
18. See Rev. Proc. 2019-18, 2019-18 I.R.B. 1077 § 2.02(3).
19. Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291.
20. Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127.
21. See Charles Dickenson & Zook Sutton, The Effect of the 1976 Tax Reform Act on
the Ownership of Professional Sports Franchises, 1 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 227,
257–58 n.131 (1977).
22. See Paul L.B. McKenney & Eric M. Nemeth, Tax Law: The Purchase and Sale of a
Sports Team: Tax Issues and Rules, 80 MICH. B.J. 54, 56 (2001).
23. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 9.
24. See Cade Massey & Richard H. Thaler, The Loser’s Curse: Decision Making &
Market Efficiency in the National Football League Draft, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1479, 1480 (2013).
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market, one would expect that employees would command that their sal-
aries be equal to their worth.25 Thus, if teams contracted with players in a
free market, the player contracts would have no value.26 However, the
markets for signing players in the United States’ five major professional
sports leagues are not free. Those markets are replete with restraints on
player compensation, which cause player contracts and future draft picks
to be valuable assets.27
All five leagues have created their own economies to promote competi-
tive balance.28 Competitive balance is essential to team profits because
fans become disinterested when certain teams dominate a league.29 One
way leagues promote competitive balance is through collective bargaining
agreements, which “govern the employer-employee relationships be-
tween the owners of professional sports teams and players’ associa-
tions.”30 The substance of the agreements vary by league, but a recurrent
theme is the goal of preventing teams from being able to “buy wins.”31
The need to prevent teams from buying wins is a concern to leagues
because some teams enjoy revenue that greatly exceeds that of other
teams in their league.32 Teams generate revenue through gate receipts,
concessions, parking, broadcasting rights, and advertising.33 Each source
of revenue is a function of the team’s fan base, which is a function of the
team’s location.34 Teams in large metropolitan areas have a larger poten-
tial fan base to pull from, and other teams have become so entrenched in
their city’s culture that fan support is extraordinary.35 Without restraints,
this disparity could allow the teams with the highest revenues to obtain
the best players by offering salaries that exceed what lower revenue
teams can afford.36 Such a scenario would disrupt competitive balance,
and league-wide revenue could decrease.37
Leagues have enacted many mechanisms to prevent the buying of wins
in their respective collective bargaining agreements. Those most relevant
25. See Wayne J. Morse, A Note on the Relationship Between Human Assets and
Human Capital, 48 ACCT. REV. 589, 593 n.6 (1973).
26. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 9.
27. See Sherwin Rosen & Allen Sanderson, Labour Markets in Professional Sports,
111 ECON. J. F47, F53 (2001).
28. See id. at F53–F57.
29. See Neale, supra note 2, at 2.
30. Paul M. Lopez et al., Valuation of the Professional Sports Franchise in Bankruptcy:
It’s a Whole Different Ballgame, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 299, 319 (2014).
31. See, e.g., Lewie Pollis, Explaining Spending: How the Market Sets the Price of a
Win, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/
article/23269/explaining-spending-how-the-market-sets-the-price-of-a-win/ [https://perma
.cc/F6HH-R5SG].
32. For example, the New York Yankees generated approximately $668 million in rev-
enue in 2018, while the Oakland Athletics generated $218 million. The Business of Base-
ball, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/mlb-valuations/list/#tab:overall [https://perma.cc/
9DL9-7BX6] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
33. See Zaritsky, supra note 12, at 685.
34. See Lopez et al., supra note 30, at 333–34.
35. Id. at 334.
36. See BERRI ET AL., supra note 10, at 9.
37. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 7.
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to this article are team salary caps, restraints on player free agency, and
maximum salary caps for individual players. All five major professional
sports leagues employ some variation of a salary cap, which serves to set
a maximum amount that teams can pay the players that make up their
rosters.38 The NFL, NHL, and MLS have “hard” salary caps that forbid
teams from going over the set amount.39 The NBA has a “soft” salary cap
that allows teams to exceed the cap in certain circumstances but, outside
of those circumstances, the team will incur a “luxury tax.”40 The MLB
imposes a luxury tax on teams when the total salary that the team owes
its players for the year exceeds a set amount.41
Additionally, all five leagues restrict a player’s ability to negotiate a
salary by limiting the player’s right to negotiate to a single team until the
player has reached “free agent” status.42 For example, an MLB player
cannot freely negotiate his salary until after serving six years in the league
because a single team holds his right to play in the MLB.43 Thus, if the
player is unhappy with the salary offered, league rules limit his choices to
either accepting the salary or not playing professional baseball.44 The
NBA and NHL further restrict player compensation by imposing a limit
on the maximum amount that a team can pay an individual player.45
Together, these restrictions on player salaries contribute to the high
possibility that teams will pay players less than the revenue they generate
for their team, giving rise to player contracts and future draft picks with
38. See Helmut M. Dietl et al., Salary Cap Regulation in Professional Team Sports, 30
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 307, 307 (2012); see also Jim Pagels, Are Salary Caps for Profes-
sional Athletes Fair?, PRICEONOMICS (Aug. 19, 2014), https://priceonomics.com/are-salary-
caps-for-professional-athletes-fair/ [https://perma.cc/XEM2-P3AK] (explaining the various
salary cap mechanisms in each professional sports league).
39. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE & NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N, COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION: SEPTEMBER 16, 2012–SEPTEMBER 15, 2022, art.
50, § 50.5 (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/cba [https://perma.cc/3PAU-
4LGR] [hereinafter NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT]; NAT’L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT, art. 12, § 6 (Aug. 4, 2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-
bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TL3-3L7M]; MLS Roster Rules and
Regulations 2018, MLS: COMMS. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.mlssoccer.com/league/official-
rules/mls-roster-rules-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/84WH-TLQ7] [hereinafter MLS
Roster Rules].
40. NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N & NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, 2017 NBA-
NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (EFFECTIVE AS OF 7/1/2017), art. 7, § 2(a)
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://nbpa.com/cba/ [https://perma.cc/EG7X-ZSP6] [hereinafter NBA
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT].
41. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL & MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2017-2021, art. 23 (2017), http://www.mlbplayers.com/
ViewArticle.dbml?DBOEM_ID=34000&ATCLID=211078089 [https://perma.cc/8YZP-
SENG] [hereinafter MLB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT].
42. See Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the Re-
serve System to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS L.J. 21, 41–56 (2008) (providing an overview of
free agency rules in professional sports leagues).
43. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 6–8.
44. See id.
45. NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at art. 2, § 7; NHL
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at art. 50, § 50.6.
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considerable value.46 However, the potential also exists for a player con-
tract with a negative value.47 Player contracts have a negative value when
a player’s salary exceeds the player’s worth.48 Releasing the player may
relieve a team from any non-guaranteed salary obligations.49 Yet, releas-
ing a player with guaranteed salary obligations would give rise to “dead
money,” an obligation to pay players that are no longer on a team’s ros-
ter.50 Unlike player contracts, future draft picks cannot have a negative
value because a team can always choose not to draft or contract with
certain players.51
III. FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO TRADES BETWEEN TEAMS
Sales or exchanges of property with considerable value may lead to
considerable tax consequences. Before the TCJA, taxes posed no obstacle
to trades between sports teams, which was a good thing considering a
team general manager would likely balk at needing to consult tax counsel
before each trade.52 Now, such consultation should occur because every
trade could cause considerable tax consequences.53 The frequency of
trades heightens the need for consultation. In 2018, teams in the United
States’ five professional sports leagues engaged in 441 trades, involving
875 players and 249 future draft picks or similar assets.54 Thus, team own-
46. See McKenney & Nemeth, supra note 22, at 56.
47. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 16.
48. See id. at 15–16.
49. See id. at 16.
50. See Scott Croker, 15 Biggest Dead Money Salaries in MLB, BUS. PUNDIT (May 23,
2016), http://www.businesspundit.com/15-biggest-dead-money-salaries-in-mlb-05-2016/
[https://perma.cc/F89S-3KK5]; see also LEWIS, supra note 6, at 150 (describing the deal in
which the New York Yankees paid half of David Justice’s $3.5 million-dollar salary for him
to play for the Oakland Athletics).
51. See Matthew Murphy, How Much is a Draft Pick Worth in 2014?, HARDBALL
TIMES (May 21, 2014) https://tht.fangraphs.com/how-much-is-a-draft-pick-worth-in-2014/
[https://perma.cc/KG94-Q2CD].
52. See Inquiry into Professional Sports: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on Prof.
Sports, 94th Cong. 209 (1976) (statement of Robert O. Swados, Special Tax Counsel, NHL)
(speaking as an owner of an NHL team: “I, personally, would not relish informing my
general manager . . . that he must consult tax counsel every time he seeks to . . . trade a
player.”).
53. See Becky Sullivan & Alisa Chang, Tax Change Delivers a Blow to Professional
Sports, NPR (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/21/595610804/professional-
sports-leagues-go-head-to-head-with-new-tax-code [https://perma.cc/4Y7D-N5UC].
54. MLB Transactions, SPOTRAC, https://www.spotrac.com/nhl/transactions/2018/
trade/ [https://perma.cc/W6ZL-RUZM] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) (MLB teams engaged
in 199 trades involving 423 players, 4 future draft picks, and 24 future considerations);
MLS Transactions, SPOTRAC, https://www.spotrac.com/mls/transactions/2018/trade/ [https:/
/perma.cc/Q6L9-528N] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) (MLS teams engaged in 39 trades in-
volving 50 players, 15 future draft picks, 1 future consideration, and 3 international roster
spots); NBA Transactions, SPOTRAC, https://www.spotrac.com/nba/transactions/2018/all/
trade/ [https://perma.cc/E283-VMEY] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) (NBA teams engaged in
51 trades involving 126 players, 55 future draft picks, 2 draft rights to specific players, and 1
future consideration); NFL Transactions, SPOTRAC, https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/transac-
tions/2018/trade/ [https://perma.cc/V63J-YCG5] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) (NFL teams
engaged in 62 trades involving 71 players, 99 future draft picks, and 1 “future considera-
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ers and general managers would be well-served by reviewing the basic
rules of federal income taxation. This part of the article does just that.
A. FEDERAL INCOME TAX FUNDAMENTALS
The United States federal government levies taxes on income.55 More
specifically, the federal government taxes “taxable income,” which the
Code defines to mean “gross income minus the deductions allowed by
this chapter.”56 The Code defines gross income as “all income from
whatever source derived.”57 Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regula-
tions define income, but the Supreme Court has explained that income
includes all “instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly real-
ized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”58 The Trea-
sury Regulations add that “[g]ross income includes income realized in
any form, whether in money, property, or services.”59 In sum, all clearly
realized accessions to wealth are taxable, regardless of form, unless ex-
cluded by law.60
Tax laws slightly complicate the process of determining tax liabilities
associated with dealings in property because not all money, property, or
services received in exchange for property necessarily result in gross in-
come.61 A taxpayer must first recover the cost of the property before any
increase in wealth is realized and, further, that increase must be recog-
nized for tax purposes.62 The Code refers to the increase or decrease in
wealth from the disposition of property as a gain or loss.63 A gain is “the
excess of the amount realized [from the disposition] over the [property’s]
adjusted basis . . . .”64 A loss is “the excess of the [property’s] adjusted
basis . . . over the amount realized” from the disposition.65
The Code further defines both “amount realized” and “basis.”66
“Amount realized” is defined as “the sum of any money received plus the
fair market value of the property (other than money) received.”67 A
property’s “fair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
tion”); NHL Transactions, SPOTRAC, https://www.spotrac.com/nhl/transactions/2018/trade/
[https://perma.cc/HM7S-QPTA] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) (NHL teams engaged in 90
trades involving 200 players, 71 future draft picks, and 4 future considerations).
55. See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 152 (1998).
56. I.R.C. § 63(a) (2017).
57. Id. § 61(a).
58. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1957).
60. See I.R.C. § 63(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1957).
61. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a).
62. See Bryan T. Camp, Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1, 15 (2007).
63. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. §§ 1001(b), 1012(a).
67. Id. § 1001(b).
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under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of relevant facts.”68 Determining the fair market value is a question
of fact, and in “rare and extraordinary” circumstances, the law may deem
that a property does not have a fair market value.69 If a seller receives
services in an exchange, those services have a value consistent with the
retail prices normally charged for such services70 and the fair market
value of the property transferred.71
The term “basis” essentially “refers to the way in which the tax system
tracks what part of the value of a piece of property will not constitute
gross income.”72 The Code describes a property’s basis to “be the cost of
such property,”73 which may change because of additional investments or
allowable deductions.74 A taxpayer’s cost basis in a property varies ac-
cording to how the taxpayer obtained the property.75
Relevant to trades between teams, the basis in property received in an
exchange is generally the fair market value of that property.76 If the fair
market value of the property received “cannot be determined with rea-
sonable accuracy,” then the fair market value of the property transferred
may be used, so long as the transaction is at arms-length.77 If the fair
market value of each property cannot “be ascertained with a reasonable
degree of accuracy, the taxpayer is entitled to carry over the [basis of the
property transferred] as the cost basis of the [property received].”78 A
taxpayer’s cost basis in a property may then be increased “for expendi-
tures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to capital ac-
count.”79 The cost basis may also be decreased to account for
“exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion.”80
An amount realized that exceeds the property’s adjusted basis does not
necessarily result in a taxable gain.81 As a general rule, the Code recog-
nizes all gains or losses for tax purposes unless stated otherwise.82 How-
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (as amended in 2018).
69. Id. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 2017).
70. See Rooney v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 523, 528 (1987).
71. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962). But see Seas Shipping Co. v.
Comm’r, 371 F.2d 528, 529–30 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting the “dangers in evaluating the consid-
eration involved in one side of a barter by determining the worth of the consideration on
the other side”).
72. Camp, supra note 62, at 16.
73. I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2017).
74. Id. §§ 1011(b), 1016(a)(1)–(2).
75. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 551,
BASIS OF ASSETS 2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p551.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HCA2-2T5U] (providing a detailed explanation for determining a taxpayer’s basis in an
asset).
76. See Davis, 370 U.S. at 73; Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States., 126 F.
Supp. 184, 188 (1954).
77. Phila. Park, 126 F. Supp. at 189.
78. Id.
79. I.R.C. § 1016 (a)(1).
80. Id. § 1016 (a)(2).
81. See, e.g., id. § 1031.
82. See id. § 1001(c).
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ever, non-recognition provisions exist throughout the Code,83 each
serving certain policy objectives.84 Although, after the TCJA, a non-rec-
ognition provision pertaining to trades between teams does not exist, un-
less the opposing team owners also happen to be spouses.85
Since marriage between the owners of opposing teams seems unlikely,
teams will probably incur tax consequences whenever a gain or loss is
realized in a trade. The exact tax consequences vary according to the
character of the recognized gain or loss. Thus, teams must characterize
gains to determine the rate at which they will be taxed. This is a complex
topic, but broadly speaking, gains from dealings in property are either
taxed as ordinary income, with the current maximum tax rate being
37%,86 or at a preferential rate.87
Gain incurred from trades between teams may receive preferential
treatment because player contracts are § 1231 assets if held for over one
year.88 However, the gain may also be subject to the recapture rules of
§ 1245.89 Section 1245 recaptures gain attributed to depreciation or amor-
tization deductions and taxes that amount as ordinary income.90 Section
1231 provides the rules for any uncharacterized gain that may remain. If
all of a taxpayer’s § 1231 gains exceed the § 1231 losses for the taxable
year, then the gains and losses become long-term capital gains and
losses,91 which results in net gains from player contracts being taxed at a
maximum rate of 23.8%.92 If all of a taxpayer’s § 1231 losses exceed the
83. See, e.g., id. §§ 351(a), 751(a).
84. For example, “the purpose of § 721 is to facilitate the flow of property from indi-
viduals to partnerships that will use the property productively . . . [by preventing] the mere
change in form from precipitating taxation.” Superior Trading, LLC v. Comm’r, 137 T.C.
70, 86 (2011) (quoting United States v. Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043, 1048, 1053 (11th Cir.
1984)).
85. See I.R.C. § 1041(a)(1) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of prop-
erty from an individual to . . . a spouse.”).
86. Id. §§ 1(a)–(d), (j)(2).
87. Compare I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), (j)(2) (providing tax rates for ordinary income
through 2025), with I.R.C. §§ 1(h), (j)(5) (providing tax rates for capital gains through
2025).
88. Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; see also
I.R.C. § 1231(a) (providing rules for when a taxpayer’s gains and losses derived from all
dealings in § 1231 assets for the taxable year are treated as long-term capital gain and
losses or as an ordinary gains and losses); Hollywood Baseball Ass’n v. Comm’r, 423 F.2d
494, 497 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he Tax Court properly held that . . . the player contracts were
not primarily held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.”).
89. The recapture rules of § 1245 require a taxpayer to characterize gain as ordinary
income when it is attributable to depreciation or amortization of property. See I.R.C.
§ 1245(a). The section does not explicitly include intangible property that is amortized rat-
ably over the life of the property in its definition of § 1245 property. See id. §§ 1245(a)(3),
(b)(8). However, the inclusion of both all depreciable tangible property and all § 197 intan-
gible property makes the inclusion of depreciable contracts likely. See id. §§ 1245(a)(3),
(b)(8).
90. Id. § 1245(a).
91. Id. § 1231(a)(1).
92. Id. §§ 1(h)(3), 1411. However, individual taxpayers with taxable income of less
than $452,800 are currently taxed at a rate of 15% on adjusted net capital gains. Id.
§ 1(j)(5)(B)(ii).
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§ 1231 gains for the taxable year, then the gains and losses become
ordinary gains and losses.93
B. THE POTENTIAL BREADTH OF “GROSS INCOME” AND SOME LIMITS
The existence of non-recognition provisions in the Code illustrates that
not all accessions to wealth are gross income, despite the term’s broad
definition. Nonetheless, most tax scholars agree that the Haig-Simons
definition of income is the ideal definition of income.94 Under the Haig-
Simons definition, “[p]ersonal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question.”95 In other words, income is
the change in a person’s ability to consume during a given period.96 The
Constitution gives Congress the power to tax the full reach of the Haig-
Simons definition of income by stating, “Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.”97 Indeed,
Congress intended its definition of gross income to be as broad as consti-
tutionally allowed.98 However, the potential breadth of gross income
commonly gives way to promote competing policy, which includes ad-
dressing issues of equity, efficiency, and administrability.99
1. Required Deviations from the Haig-Simons Definition of Income
Deviations from the Haig-Simons definition of income often occur be-
cause tax laws must be administrable.100 This requirement likely explains
the most significant deviation of Haig-Simons in the United States’ fed-
eral income tax system: the realization doctrine.101 The realization doc-
trine prevents accessions to wealth from being taxed until an objective,
identifiable event has taken place.102 The doctrine eliminates the need to
value property periodically and makes many accessions to wealth easier
to measure because sellers often dispose of property for money.103
Administrability also justifies why the IRS sometimes deviates from
93. Id. § 1231(a)(2).
94. See Christopher H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax Reform, 59 SMU L. REV. 435,
436 (2006).
95. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS
A PROBLEM OF A FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
96. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R45145, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM IN 2018, at 2 (2018).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A18–19 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 168 (1954).
99. See Hanna, supra note 94, at 436–37.
100. See Camp, supra note 62, at 25.
101. See Hanna, supra note 94, at 436–37; see also Camp, supra note 62, at 24 (“This
economic view of income does not translate well into tax law because it ignores the practi-
cal requirement that income be something that can be reliably measured, reported, and
paid.”).
102. See Camp, supra note 62, at 29–30.
103. See Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of Hedging in a
Realization Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 18 (1996).
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Congress’s broad proclamation that “gross income means all income.”104
Examples of such deviations include the non-taxation of imputed in-
come105 and the receipt of frequent flyer miles derived from business
travel.106 Imputed income is the “investment of capital or performance of
services for one’s own personal or family use.”107 A person that buys a
house outright and lives in the house has imputed income equal to the
house’s rental value.108 Likewise, a person that consumes goods created
through the person’s own efforts or that provides a service to themselves
has imputed income equal to their value.109 The federal government taxes
neither type of imputed income.110 Tax scholars rationalize this treatment
by noting the reporting problems that would plague taxpayers and the
IRS’s inability to enforce compliance or measure accessions to wealth.111
Similar reasoning justifies the IRS’s decision to not assert an understated
federal tax liability when a taxpayer does not report the “receipt or per-
sonal use of frequent flyer miles . . . attributable to the taxpayer’s busi-
ness or official travel.”112
Administrability and potential public backlash explain why the IRS
does not enforce a tax on fans that catch a home run baseball, at least
until the fan sells the ball.113 When a fan catches a home run ball, they
have experienced an undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized, and
over which they have complete dominion.114 The IRS’s enforcement of
such a tax would be equitable because a taxpayer that similarly comes
into possession of found property is taxed on gain equal to the property’s
value.115 Taxing the fan would also be economically efficient because tax-
ing accessions to wealth equally does not encourage certain behaviors
over others.116 Still, to the IRS, administrability trumps equity and effi-
ciency because of enforcement and valuation issues.117
Further, the IRS knows of the public backlash likely to occur should
baseball fans incur a tax liability at the moment of catching a home run
104. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2017); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income,
11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 344 (2011).
105. Morris v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928); WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 68–71 (5th ed. 1999).
106. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 (2002).
107. ANDREWS, supra note 105, at 68.
108. Id.
109. Hanna, supra note 94, at 437 n.19.
110. See Morris, 9 B.T.A. at 1278.
111. Steve R. Johnson, Imputed Rental Income: Reality Trumps Theory, in CONTROVER-
SIES IN TAX LAW: A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE 65, 79–89 (Anthony C. Infanti ed., 2015).
112. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 (2002).
113. See I.R.S. News Release IR-98-56 (Sept. 8, 1998); see also Tom Herman, The Big
Catch Could Have a Big Catch, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB118532191532076935 [https://perma.cc/2SZF-YFS7] (noting that no formal IRS guidance
addresses taxation of home run baseballs and that, while tax scholars disagree on the issue,
“it’s highly unlikely that the IRS would be willing to risk the wrath of a baseball-loving
nation by taxing the fan right away”).
114. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
115. See Cesarini v. United States, 428 F.2d 812, 813–14 (6th Cir. 1970).
116. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 104, at 344 n.175.
117. See id. at 344.
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ball.118 In September 1998, an IRS spokesperson became disdained by
baseball fans everywhere when he stated that a fan would incur a gift tax
by catching Mark McGwire’s record-setting home run ball and promptly
returning it to McGwire.119 One congressman stated that taxing a fan for
catching a record-setting baseball is “a prime example of what is wrong
with our current tax code.”120 Another congressman introduced a bill
“[t]o clarify the income and gift tax consequences of catching and re-
turning record home run baseballs.”121 Congress did not enact the bill,
likely because the IRS quickly reversed its position by stating that a fan
“who catches a home run ball and immediately returns it . . . would not
have taxable income.”122 In doing so, the IRS carefully noted that the tax
consequences could be different if the fan sold the ball123 but has issued
no further guidance on the issue.124
2. Desired Deviations from the Haig-Simons Definition of Income
Congress intentionally deviates from the Haig-Simons definition of in-
come to include tax expenditures in the Code.125 Tax expenditures are
“revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of
tax liability.”126 The purpose of their existence is to promote certain pol-
icy objectives.127 Exclusions from the Code’s definition of gross income
are types of tax expenditures that most blatantly deviate from the Haig-
Simons definition of income.128
Non-recognition provisions are a tax expenditure that deviate less bla-
tantly from the Haig-Simons definition of income.129 This tax expenditure
is less evasive because a taxpayer will generally be taxed on the unrecog-
118. See Herman, supra note 113.




120. Andrew D. Appleby, Ball Busters: How the IRS Should Tax Record-Setting Base-
balls and Other Found Property Under the Treasure Trove Regulation, 33 VT. L. REV. 43,
47 (2008).
121. H.R. 4522, 105th Cong. (1998).
122. I.R.S. News Release IR-98-56 (Sept. 8, 1998).
123. Id.
124. See Appleby, supra note 120, at 48.
125. See DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44012, TAX EXPENDITURES:
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 2 (2015). For a list and the predicted cost of every tax expendi-
ture for 2017 through 2018, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021, 115TH CONG., JCX-34-18, at 5 (Comm.
Print 2018).
126. 2 U.S.C. § 622 (2017).
127. See MARPLES, supra note 125, at 12.
128. See SHERLOCK & MARPLES, supra note 96, at 2. For a list of items specifically
excluded from gross income, see I.R.C. §§ 101–139G (2017).
129. See Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Re-
form, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 980, 981 (1967).
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nized gain in the future.130 One example of such a tax expenditure is
§ 1031, which affords non-recognition treatment to exchanges of “like-
kind” property.131 Like other non-recognition provisions, § 1031 allows a
taxpayer to defer any realized gain beyond the year of the exchange.132
Congress desires the deviation because it promotes exchanges of property
that may not occur in the presence of a tax.133
C. A BRIEF HISTORY OF § 1031 AND JUSTIFICATION
FOR LIKE-KIND TREATMENT
Section 1031 of the Code allows taxpayers to exchange qualifying “like-
kind” property that has been “held for productive use in a trade or busi-
ness or for investment” without gain or loss being recognized.134 The
Treasury views properties as like-kind when they have the same “nature
or character” without regard to their individual “grade or quality.”135 The
Code does not prevent the gain or loss involved in a like-kind exchange
from ever being recognized.136 Instead, the unrecognized gain or loss is
merely deferred until taxpayers sell acquired property because their basis
in acquired property becomes that of the property transferred.137
1. Section 1031 Before the TCJA
A section concerning the non-recognition treatment of like-kind ex-
changes has existed in the Code since 1921.138 In that year, a depression
plagued the United States, and Congress became concerned with main-
taining a balanced federal budget.139 Congress evidenced this concern by
explaining the special treatment afforded to like-kind exchanges will “in-
crease the revenue by preventing taxpayers from taking colorable losses
in wash sales and other fictitious exchanges.”140 Now that the United
States is no longer in a depression, some commentators have argued that
a fear of overwhelming loss recognition is an unpersuasive justification
for the special treatment afforded like-kind exchanges.141 Still, tax laws
should not permit taxpayers to significantly reduce their tax liability with-
130. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031(d).
131. Id. § 1031.
132. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES 2 (2014), https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Like-Kind-Exchange-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6986-UTEG] [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, LIKE-
KIND EXCHANGES].
133. See H.R. REP. 67-350, at 10 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 11 (1921).
134. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1 (as amended in 1991).
136. See Erik M. Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for Special Treatment of Like-Kind
Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 193, 196 (1985).
137. See I.R.C. § 1031(d).
138. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921).
139. See JAMES GRANT, THE FORGOTTEN DEPRESSION 71–72 (2015).
140. H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 10 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 11–12 (1921). Congress
reiterated this concern when declining to repeal the like-kind provision in 1934. H.R. REP.
NO. 73-704, at 564 (1934) (“If all exchanges were made taxable . . . claims for theoretical
losses would probably exceed any profits.”).
141. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 136, at 212–13.
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out fundamentally changing their economic position.142
Other policy considerations explain why the provision has remained
mostly unchanged from 1924,143 until the TCJA limited like-kind treat-
ment to real property.144 Specifically, administrative considerations, the
promotion of economic efficiency, and the continuity of investment ex-
plain the special treatment afforded like-kind exchanges.145 Congress and
courts have cited administrative considerations, since 1934, when Con-
gress declined to eliminate the provision from the Code.146 There, Con-
gress feared the difficulty of valuing property that taxpayers had
exchanged for similar property would cause administrative costs to ex-
ceed potential revenue.147
Some courts and commentators have argued that administrative diffi-
culty is not a proper justification for § 1031 on grounds that parties to an
exchange necessarily value the property before the exchange occurs.148
This criticism is unfounded. Parties engage in exchanges because “each
side wants the specific goods the other side offers.”149 In fact, exchanges
often occur without regard to the value of goods involved; instead, the
crux of the exchange is that the goods being received have a higher mar-
ginal utility to the recipient than the goods being transferred.150
Moreover, Congress has cited the promotion of economic efficiency as
justification for the special treatment afforded like-kind exchanges.151
Congress believed removing tax obstacles from certain transactions
142. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
143. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(b)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 256; see also
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
397, 405 (1987) (explaining Congress’s changes to the like-kind rules).
144. Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13303(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2123
(2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1031). For a detailed summary of the legislative
history of § 1031, see John R. Dorocak, Protecting Real Estate Investors: The Fight to Main-
tain the Like-Kind Standard for Exchanges under I.R.C. Section 1031—“You Don’t have to
Call Me Darling, Darling”, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571, 592–94 (1993); Kornhauser,
supra note 143, at 400–07 nn.8–19.
145. See Jensen, supra note 136, at 199.
146. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 6 (1934); see also STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAX’N, 98TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUC-
TION ACT OF 1984, JCS-41-84, at 245 (Comm. Print 1985) (“The special treatment of like-
kind exchanges has also been justified from an administrative standpoint because of the
difficulty of valuing property which is exchanged solely or primarily for similar property.”);
Century Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951) (“[Congress] was concerned
with the administrative problem involved in the computation of gain or loss in transactions
of the character with which the [now § 1031] deals.” In such transactions “the market value
of the properties of like kind involved in the transfer does not enter into the question.”).
147. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 13.
148. See Leslie Co. v. Comm’r, 539 F.2d 943, 948–49 (3d Cir. 1976); Jordan Marsh Co. v.
Comm’r, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959); Jensen, supra note 136, at 208 n.74.
149. George Dalton, Barter, 16 J. ECON. ISSUES 181, 181 (1982).
150. See Caroline Humphrey & Stephen Hugh-Jones, Introduction to BARTER, EX-
CHANGE AND VALUE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 1, 9 (Caroline Humphrey &
Stephen Hugh-Jones eds., 1992) (“[I]n barter . . . [e]ven if some notion of monetary value
hovers in the background, . . . it would be a mistake to think that the consumption or use
values of the objects are measurable by some common, abstract standard held in the heads
of the two parties.”).
151. See H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 10 (1921).
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would “permit business to go forward with the readjustments required by
existing conditions.”152 Taxing like-kind exchanges could cause taxpayers
to hold onto assets they would normally sell, locking in capital and
preventing it from being used in an economically efficient manner.153 Af-
ter all, reinvestment after the disposal of property may not occur when
taxes make the taxpayer unable to purchase property of comparable
value.154
The strongest justification for the non-recognition treatment of like-
kind exchanges is continuity of investment.155 This theory justifies § 1031
because “the taxpayer’s economic situation after the exchange is funda-
mentally the same as it was before the transaction occurred.”156 In other
words, Congress believed it would be unfair to impose a tax when the
taxpayer’s original investment remains invested in a substantially similar
property.157
2. Section 1031 After the TCJA
Congress likely considered the justifications for § 1031 when deciding
to limit like-kind treatment to real property as part of the TCJA.158 The
official reason for the change is that the “increased and expanded expens-
ing under sections 168(k) and 179 for tangible personal property and cer-
tain building improvements” makes like-kind treatment for non-real
property unnecessary.159 Section 168(k) provides taxpayers with an addi-
tional deduction allowance for qualifying property,160 and § 179 allows
taxpayers to expense the cost of qualifying property subject to a dollar
amount limitation.161 Notably, § 168(k) allows a 100% deduction allow-
ance for the year qualifying property is placed in service until January 1,
2023.162 Increased expensing justifies the repeal of non-recognition for
certain like-kind exchanges because the expensing will help offset any in-
curred tax liabilities and will encourage investment in all types of prop-
152. Id. at 176; S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 189 (1921).
153. See Kornhauser, supra note 143, at 408. But see Jensen, supra note 136, at 214
(arguing that the non-recognition treatment of like-kind exchanges is actually inefficient
because it “encourages overinvestment in property suitable for such exchanges”).
154. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES, supra note 132, at 2.
155. Jensen, supra note 136, at 199.
156. Koch v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 54, 63 (1978); see also Leslie Co. v. Comm’r, 539 F.2d
943, 949 (3d Cir. 1976) (adopting continuity of investment as justification for § 1031); Jor-
dan Marsh Co. v. Comm’r, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959) (“Congress was primarily con-
cerned with the inequity . . . of forcing a taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which was still
tied up in a continuing investment of the same sort.”); Portland Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 109
F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940) (“It is the purpose of [now § 1031] to [prevent] recognition of
a gain, or . . . loss, in certain transactions where gain or loss may have accrued in a constitu-
tional sense, but where in a popular and economic sense there has been a mere change in
the form of ownership.”).
157. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 13 (1934).
158. See Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13303(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2123
(2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1031); H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 255 (2017).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 255.
160. I.R.C. § 168(k) (2017).
161. Id. §§ 179(a)–(b).
162. Id. § 168(k)(6)(A)(i).
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erty, rather than only property that qualifies for like-kind exchanges.163
However, Congress’s reason for limiting like-kind treatment to real
property does not justify the reason for excluding property that falls
outside the scope of § 168(k) or § 179 from non-recognition treatment.164
In fact, most types of intangible property do not qualify for increased
expensing under those sections.165 This leaves intangible property owners
with pre-TCJA depreciation schedules and no ability to make like-kind
exchanges.166
Congress may not have considered exchanges of like-kind intangible
property when revising § 1031.167 This oversight seems likely considering
an overwhelming majority of like-kind exchanges before the TCJA in-
volved real estate and vehicles,168 the latter falling within the purview of
§ 168(k) and § 179.169 Still, teams engage in hundreds of trades each
year,170 involving hundreds of intangible assets that do not qualify for
increased expensing.171
D. TAXING TRADES BETWEEN TEAMS
For tax purposes, teams that trade players and future draft picks are
trading intangible assets. Like dispositions of other types of property,
teams must first recover the cost of the player contract or future draft
pick before any increase in wealth is realized and, further, that increase
must be recognized for a tax liability to result.172 The cost of a player
contract includes the “(a) amounts paid or incurred upon the purchase of
a player contract, and (b) bonuses paid to players for signing player con-
tracts.”173 Teams must capitalize such cost because the contract provides
a benefit that extends for the duration of the contract. The team may then
recover the cost over the contract’s term, unless the contract is obtained
163. See Emily L. Foster, Advocates Aim to Preserve Like-Kind Exchange in Tax Re-
form, TAX NOTES (May 3, 2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/editors-pick/advocates-aim-
preserve-kind-exchange-tax-reform [https://perma.cc/8MU2-ZW2N].
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 255; see also I.R.C. §§ 168(k)(2), 179(d)(1) (exclud-
ing most types of intangible property from their scope).
165. See I.R.C. §§ 168(k)(2), 179(d)(1).
166. See Nathan J. Richman, Proposed Like-Kind Exchange Limitation Raises Mis-
match Concerns, TAX NOTES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://v6k8u5d3.stackpathcdn.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/2017/11/Proposed-Like-Kind-Exchange-Limitation-Raises-Mismatch-Con
cerns_Richman_TaxNotes-11-7-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EG3-BL23].
167. See Paul Jacobs, A Legislative Error to Open Baseball Season, PALISADES HUDSON
FIN. GROUP (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.palisadeshudson.com/2018/03/a-legislative-error-
to-open-baseball-season/ [https://perma.cc/9VSP-PXKU].
168. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES, supra note 132, at 1,
3.
169. See I.R.C. §§ 168(k)(2), 179(d)(1); see also HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS, INC., AN-
NUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 72 (Mar. 19, 2014) (“[R]ecognized tax gains on vehicle
dispositions resulting from the [Like-Kind Exchange] suspension were more than offset by
100% tax depreciation on newly acquired vehicles.”).
170. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
171. See I.R.C. §§ 168(k)(2), 179(d)(1).
172. See Camp, supra note 62, at 15.
173. Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
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through the purchase of a sports franchise.174 In that case, the team may
recover the cost ratably over fifteen years.175 Unlike player contracts, fu-
ture draft picks that a league awards to a team do not have an initial cost
separate from the sport franchise asset.176 Nonetheless, teams may have a
cost basis in future draft picks that have been acquired through trade.177
1. Taxing Trades Before the TCJA
Before the TCJA, the IRS treated the trading of player contracts and
future draft picks as a like-kind exchange.178 By analogy, this treatment
also could extend to other intangible assets involving the right to receive
services from players,179 such as the draft rights to certain players,180 the
right to participate in expansion drafts,181 and the right to international
roster slots.182 When trades between teams occurred, the teams would
recognize any gain or loss realized from the exchange only if teams re-
ceived money or property other than like-kind property, known as
“boot.”183 Any unrecognized gain or loss would then be deferred until
the team sold or exchanged the player contract for non-like-kind prop-
erty.184 However, teams could avoid the taxing of deferred gain by retain-
ing the player for the contract’s entire duration.185
Treating assets involving the right to receive services from players as
like-kind property meant that teams could engage in a variety of trades
without incurring a tax liability. Even trades involving players to be
named later186 would not result in taxable gain so long as the teams satis-
fied certain timing limitations.187 Moreover, when taxable gain did occur
because of the receipt of boot, the taxable gain would not exceed the
value of the non-like-kind property received.188
174. Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(c)(2)(ii) (“The
basis of a right to an unspecified amount over a fixed duration of less than 15 years is
amortized ratably over the period of the right.”).
175. I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (d)(1)(C)(i).
176. IRS MSSP GUIDELINE, supra note 12, at *68.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See Dickenson & Sutton, supra note 21, at 257 n.131.
180. See Riley Moore, How It Works: Draft Rights and Signing Draft Picks, MOORE
BASKETBALL (May 30, 2016), https://moorebasketball.com/2016/05/30/how-it-works-draft-
rights-and-signing-draft-picks/ [https://perma.cc/37EU-FGXE].
181. See Satchel Price, 2017 NHL Expansion Draft Results: All the Golden Knights’
Trades, SBNATION (June 21, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/2017/6/21/15835324/nhl-ex
pansion-draft-2017-trades-vegas-golden-knights-roster [https://perma.cc/JZG4-284M].
182. See MLS Roster Rules, supra note 39.
183. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1967).
184. See I.R.C. § 1031(d) (2017).
185. See Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New Econ-
omy, 94 DENV. L. REV. 145, 177 n.162 (2016) (recognizing that tax deferral may result in
no taxation when the asset obtained in an exchange is consumed).
186. “When clubs consent to include a player to be named later . . . in a trade, they
agree to decide upon . . . the final player involved in that trade at a later date.” Player to Be
Named Later (PTBNL), MLB, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/player-to-be-named-
later [https://perma.cc/Y6XQ-5HW5] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
187. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3).
188. Id. § 1031(b).
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Fortunately for teams, the relief of salary owed to a player involved in
an exchange did not constitute boot to the transferring team.189 This is
because a player’s salary is a deductible expense,190 preventing it from
being considered when determining a team’s amount realized.191 Thus,
when the Minnesota Twins traded Dave Winfield to the Cleveland Indi-
ans in exchange for a “nice dinner,”192 the Twins realized and recognized
gain only if the fair market value of the dinner exceeded their adjusted
basis in Winfield’s contract.193 Had the Twins traded Winfield for a nice
dinner and another player, the tax consequences would have been the
same.
2. Applying Current Tax Law to Trades
After the TCJA, all trades between sports teams are taxable events
because a trade is a realization event sufficient to incur taxation,194 and
there is generally no applicable non-recognition provision.195 According
to the rules governing dispositions of property, in a simple player-for-
player trade, a team’s amount realized in the transaction will be the fair
market value of the player contract received,196 which will also be the
team’s basis in the received contract.197 Notably, a recently released reve-
nue procedure creates a safe harbor that permits teams to treat the fair
market value of a player contract or future draft pick as having zero
value.198
The team will realize a gain if the amount realized in the transaction
exceeds the team’s adjusted basis in the player contract transferred, and
the team will realize a loss should any of the adjusted basis not be recov-
ered.199 This is simple enough, when teams treat the assets as having zero
value. However, when teams avoid the zero-value safe harbor, the tax
consequences are far from simple because player contracts and future
draft picks do not have an ascertainable fair market value, unless a team
exchanges the player contract purely for money or a team retains partial
liability for a transferred contract’s salary obligations.200 Even then, those
189. See Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 5 n.6 (1947); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (1980).
190. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
191. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 5 n.6; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (1980). But see IRS MSSP
GUIDELINE, supra note 12, at *68–71 (considering the relief of salary obligations when
determining a team’s gain from trading player contracts).
192. Chris Landers, Celebrate the Madness of the Trade Deadline with Eight of the
Weirdest Trades in MLB History, MLB (July 31, 2017), https://www.mlb.com/cut4/trade-
deadline-the-weirdest-trades-in-mlb-history/c-244576290 [https://perma.cc/ZLW7-4QBH].
193. See I.R.C. § 1031(b).
194. See Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 188 (1954).
195. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
196. See id. § 1001(b).
197. See Phila. Park, 126 F. Supp. at 188.
198. See Rev. Proc. 2019-18, 2019-18 I.R.B. 1077.
199. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
200. The chief legal officer of the MLB, Daniel R. Halem, has been quoted as saying,
“There is no fair-market value of a baseball player. There isn’t.” Tankersley, supra note 16.
But see MERCER CAPITAL, PRO SPORTS PLAYER CONTRACT VALUATIONS AND THE NEW
TAX LAWS 1–2 (Nov. 2018), https://mercercapital.com/assets/Mercer-Capital-Pro-Sports-
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circumstances offer little help to the IRS’s valuation conundrum.201
IV. CRITICIZING THE APPLICATION OF CURRENT
TAX LAWS TO TRADES
When one considers the justification for § 1031 and examples of devia-
tions of the Haig-Simons definition of income, the need to return to the
pre-TCJA manner of taxing trades between teams is apparent. Applying
current tax laws to trades presents an insurmountable administration bur-
den when teams avoid the zero-value safe harbor. Furthermore, the pos-
sibility of tax arbitrage is likely to reduce, rather than increase, tax
revenue. This part of the article explains the unique aspects of both the
professional sports industry and the intangible assets traded between
teams that gives rise to these issues. In doing so, the necessity of returning
to the pre-TCJA manner of taxation is made clear.
A. APPLYING CURRENT TAX LAWS TO TRADES
IS NOT ADMINISTRABLE
The IRS is not capable of applying current tax laws to trades between
teams because the fair market value of player contracts and future draft
picks is rarely ascertainable. Professional scouts have attempted to value
players accurately since the dawn of professional sports, and yet, they still
frequently fall short.202 Surely, if the expert judgment of professional
scouts paired with the statistical analysis known as Moneyball fails to
overcome the player valuation conundrum, then tax law should not force
IRS agents to step into the shoes of scouts. To do so is likely to result in
high administration costs without reliable valuations. Moreover, the two
limited circumstances where valuation is possible do not make the appli-
cation of current tax laws to trades administrable because those circum-
stances rarely occur and administration costs will likely exceed the
potential revenue.
1. Ascertaining the Fair Market Value of Player Contracts and Future
Draft Picks Is Infeasible
Player contracts and future draft picks have value to teams, but that
does not mean the assets have an ascertainable fair market value. As
mentioned, an asset’s fair market value is the hypothetical price at which
the asset “would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller.”203 That price depends on the specific economic market in which
the transaction occurred.204 The market relevant to this article is the
Player-Contract-Valuations-and-the-New-Tax-Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY4F-SSFZ] (of-
fering player contract valuation services).
201. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
202. See BERRI ET AL., supra note 10, at 92.
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2018).
204. See Selig v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff’d, 740 F.2d
572, 578 (7th Cir. 1984).
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“player market,” which “is the one in which individual players are
bought, sold, and traded.”205 However, the distinct economies that exist
in each league limit the ability to determine the fair market value of
player contracts to only two circumstances, neither of which apply to fu-
ture draft picks.
Courts declare that an asset has an unascertainable fair market value
when the situation presents “elements of value so speculative in character
as to prohibit any reasonably based projection of worth.”206 Such situa-
tions exist when there is an absence of markets in which comparable as-
sets are sold or when the asset’s value is “contingent upon facts and
circumstances not possible to foretell with anything like fair certainty.”207
In those cases, courts defer taxation until the taxpayer subsequently sells
the asset under the open-transaction doctrine, rather than impose a tax
based on a guess of the asset’s worth.208 This is because it would be unfair
to impose a tax on a taxpayer that cannot convert the asset to the money
necessary to satisfy the tax liability.209
Any professional scout will tell you that determining an individual
player’s value to a team is speculative at best.210 Such valuations require
not only assessing a player’s current performance but also predicting a
player’s future performance.211 Yet, accurately predicting an individual
player’s impact on a team’s revenue is impossible because statistical mea-
sures cannot fully capture a player’s contribution.212 Assessing the
player’s future contribution is further complicated by the unique circum-
stances of the team,213 the difficulty in accounting for inconsistencies in a
player’s performance over time,214 and the inability to assess a player’s
star appeal with any degree of certainty.215 Not surprisingly, there is no
consensus regarding how a player should be valued by teams in the
205. Id. at 529.
206. Fisher v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 780, 794 (2008) (quoting Campbell v. United
States, 661 F.2d 209, 215 (1981)).
207. Id. (quoting Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931)).
208. See Mothe Funeral Homes, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-1147, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5125, at *15–16 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 1995).
209. See id.
210. See DICKSON, supra note 5, at 262.
211. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 37.
212. See Gerrard, supra note 8, at 229.
213. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 108; see also Benjamin Aaron Campbell et al.,
Resetting the Shot Clock: The Effect of Comobility on Human Capital, 40 J. MGMT. 531, 548
(2014) (recognizing the disruptions that adding a new player to an existing roster may
cause).
214. See BERRI ET AL., supra note 10, at 172–200.
215. See Rosen & Sanderson, supra note 27, at F49 (“Some star athletes develop per-
sonal followings that go well beyond their contribution to the quality of specific competi-
tions. ‘Star quality’ is often elusive and harder to extract from simple statistics.”).
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NFL,216 the MLB,217 the NBA,218 the NHL,219 or the MLS.220
A player’s value varies from team to team. One commentator has
noted that “the contest aspects of sports imply that the value of one
player depends on the services rendered by others.”221 Football fans un-
derstand this concept well. A great quarterback will not have great per-
formance statistics unless he has linemen to block for him and receivers
to catch his passes.222 Similarly, basketball fans understand that the offen-
sive performance of a team’s players must shift when the team changes its
player roster.223 The shifting occurs because basketball rules permit one
ball in games, and players must possess the ball to be offensively produc-
tive.224 Thus, a player likely offers a greater contribution to one team
over another, and the exact contribution will be different for every team.
Additionally, the revenue a player generates varies from team to team
because a team’s revenue is a function of the team’s location.225 Players
contribute to a team’s revenue by contributing to team wins and through
their star appeal.226 Yet, the amount of revenue that each team generates
per win is at least partially dependent on the team’s location and that
location’s characteristics, including its “population, wealth, weather, in-
frastructure, and fan loyalty.”227 The team’s fans may also be loyal to a
specific player.228 That loyalty may cause significant merchandise sales
for the player’s team in one location,229 which may not occur in another
location.
Another reason that the fair market value of a player contract is not
reliably ascertainable is because of the myriad of motivations behind
team trades.230 In barter transactions, “each side wants the specific goods
216. See Ronald Yurko et al., nflWAR: A Reproducible Method for Offensive Player
Evaluation in Football 3–6 (July 13, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Cornell
University), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.00998.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPN8-D9W5].
217. See Tankersley, supra note 16; see also BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 69–91 (explain-
ing different methods for valuing baseball players); LEWIS, supra note 6, at 28–42 (detailing
the many disagreements between the Oakland Athletics’ former head coach, Billy Beane,
and the team’s scouts when deciding players to choose in the 2002 MLB draft.).
218. See BERRI ET AL., supra note 10, at 92–97, 196; Robert Lyons Jr. et al., Determi-
nants of NBA Player Salaries, SPORT J. (May 29, 2015), http://thesportjournal.org/article/
determinants-of-nba-player-salaries/ [https://perma.cc/942M-CLZN].
219. See Daniel S. Mason & William M. Foster, Putting Moneyball on Ice?, 2 INT’L J.
SPORTS FIN. 206, 208–11 (2007).
220. See Rory Smith, Soccer’s Confounding Calculation: What’s a Player Worth?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/sports/soccer/premier-league-
transfers.html [https://perma.cc/CCL2-EFGF].
221. Rosen & Sanderson, supra note 27, at F49.
222. BERRI ET AL., supra note 10, at 184.
223. Id. at 117.
224. Id. at 115.
225. See Lopez et al., supra note 30, at 333–34.
226. See Rosen & Sanderson, supra note 27, at F48–F49.
227. BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 109.
228. Rosen & Sanderson, supra note 27, at F49.
229. See Pat Doney, ‘Luka-Mania’ Fuels Mavs’ Apparel Sales Boost, NBC DFW (Jan.
25, 2019), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/sports/Luka-Mania-Fuels-Mavs-Apparel-Sales-
Boost-504884012.html [https://perma.cc/4C9X-5HQD].
230. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2018).
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the other side offers.”231 In the sports context, teams do not want a cer-
tain player contract or future draft pick because of some abstract stan-
dard of the asset’s worth but, rather, because the trade confers a benefit
to them.232 For example, teams may engage in a trade to meet immediate
roster needs, to bring their outgoing salary in line with their league’s sal-
ary cap, to increase team wins, to increase team profits, or for the ego
boost that comes by obtaining a certain player.233 The value derived from
each benefit is impossible to determine with any certainty. For that mat-
ter, the exact benefit received may be unclear.234
The following example illustrates the differences in value that teams
may place on a given player. In 2008, the Calgary Vipers of the Golden
Baseball League signed a contract with minor league pitcher John
Odom.235 Unfortunately, Odom had an “unspecified charge on his juve-
nile record” that prevented him from entering Canada.236 This meant that
Odom could not practice with the Vipers or participate in any games that
took place in Canada, leaving the Vipers with a negatively valued player
contract.237 However, the Vipers struck a deal with the Laredo Broncos
to trade Odom for $650 worth of baseball bats.238 Accordingly, the Bron-
cos valued Odom’s worth at $650 more than his salary, despite the Viper’s
belief that he was vastly overpaid.239
Moreover, existing player valuation techniques do not apply well to the
valuation of future draft picks.240 Trades between teams often involve fu-
ture draft picks that leagues will award years into the future, even though
a team does not know the order of awarded draft picks until the end of
each season.241 This makes determining the fair market value of a draft
pick impossible. Instead, teams trade draft picks based on the under-
standing that an earlier pick in the draft is worth more than a later pick,
without assigning some abstract standard of value.242
231. Dalton, supra note 149, at 181.
232. See Humphrey & Hugh-Jones, supra note 150, at 9.
233. See First Nw. Indus. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 817, 855 n.43 (1978), rev’d on other
grounds, 649 F.2d 707, 709–710 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that an “ego factor” exists in
transactions within the sports industry).
234. See Aaron W. Clopton, Profit-Maximizing and Win-Maximizing in the National
Football League, 7 J. CONTEMP. ATHLETICS 209, 209–10 (2013) (noting that increasing wins
or profits do not necessarily require the same decision and that economists disagree as to
which goal teams prioritize).




237. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 16.
238. Associated Press, supra note 235.
239. See id.
240. See Aaron Barzilai, Assessing the Relative Value of Draft Position in the NBA
Draft, 82GAMES, http://www.82games.com/barzilai1.htm [https://perma.cc/D8SU-VUD6]
(last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., id. (providing an analysis of the relative value of a draft pick in the NBA).
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Proponents of applying current tax laws to trades between teams may
argue that administrative difficulties do not justify returning to a pre-
TCJA manner of taxation because teams value assets before engaging in
trades.243 This argument is without merit for two reasons. First, teams
likely engage in trades because the asset received in the trade has a
higher marginal utility to the recipient than the asset being transferred,
not because of some common abstract standard of value.244 Second, cases
in which courts have arbitrarily allocated a portion of the purchase price
of a professional sports team to player contracts illustrate the highly spec-
ulative nature of such valuations.245
Before the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, disputes between the
IRS and teams often occurred regarding the portion of the purchase price
that teams could allocate to player contracts versus the franchise itself.246
These disputes occurred because teams could amortize the cost to acquire
player contracts in connection with a professional sports franchise but
could not amortize the cost of the franchise or some other intangibles.247
Teams allocated large portions of the purchase price to player contracts,
and in response, the IRS would contest the team’s allocation.248
When resolving these disputes, courts were “called upon to measure
the worth of men, not machinery, a task of no small proportions.”249 Not
surprisingly, courts either reached compromise valuations250 or sided
with valuations provided by general managers of other teams within the
applicable league.251 In reaching their decisions, courts found statistical
methods of valuing player contracts, similar to Moneyball, to be highly
speculative, calling them “unreliable,”252 “ridiculous,”253 and “thoroughly
unpersuasive.”254 Instead, courts often relied on independent, expert tes-
timony based on professional judgment.255 The inability to value player
contracts reliably caused the IRS to decide player valuations no longer
243. See Erwin, supra note 16, at 53.
244. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
245. See Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 573–80 (7th Cir. 1984); Laird v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1237–42 (5th Cir. 1977); P.D.B. Sports v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 423, 426,
443–46 (1997); First Nw. Indus. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 817, 850–58 (1978), rev’d on other
grounds, 649 F.2d 707, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1981).
246. Erwin, supra note 16, at 52.
247. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 886, 118 Stat. 1418,
1641.
248. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, at 359 (2004).
249. Laird, 556 F.2d at 1241.
250. See, e.g., id. at 1237–38; First Nw. Indus., 70 T.C. at 850–57.
251. See, e.g., Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 576–80 (7th Cir. 1984); P.D.B. Sports
v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 423, 426, 447 (1997).
252. Selig v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 524, 539 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff’d, 740 F.2d 572,
578 (7th Cir. 1984).
253. First Nw. Indus., 70 T.C. at 854.
254. Laird, 556 F.2d at 1238 n.22.
255. See id. at 1237–38; Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 533–34; P.D.B. Sports, 109 T.C. at 426,
447; First Nw. Indus., 70 T.C. at 850–55.
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merited “serious litigation investment.”256 Eventually, Congress ended
the possibility of such disputes by allowing ratable amortization deduc-
tions over a fifteen-year period for all intangible assets acquired in con-
nection with a sports franchise.257 Congress did so because spending
“taxpayer and government resources disputing [player contract valua-
tions] is an unproductive use of economic resources.”258
The characteristics of the professional sports industry make ascertain-
ing the fair market value of player contracts and future draft picks gener-
ally impossible to do with any accuracy. Doing so for a simple player-for-
player trade is overwhelmingly complex. Now, try to imagine the com-
plexity of evaluating a trade involving a combination of eighteen player
contracts and future draft picks, such as a trade that once occurred be-
tween the Dallas Cowboys and the Minnesota Vikings.259
2. The Two Circumstances in Which the Fair Market Value of Player
Contracts Is Ascertainable Do Not Overcome the
Administration Burden
The fair market value of a player contract is ascertainable both when a
team exchanges a contract purely for money and when a team retains
partial liability for a transferred contract’s salary obligations. The ability
to determine a fair market value in these circumstances is best under-
stood by first recalling that, in arms-length barter transactions, the values
of the assets exchanged are presumed to be equal.260 Accordingly, when
an exchange involves assets with unequal value, one side will probably
demand that the other side offset the difference in value with money or
other property.261 In trades between teams, money may take the form of
partially retained salary obligations262 or, in some leagues, of a simple
transfer of money.263 The two forms differ because a team that retains
256. Stephen A. Zorn, “Couldna Done It Without the Players:” Depreciation of Profes-
sional Sports Player Contracts Under the Internal Revenue Code, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORTS
L. 337, 390 (1994).
257. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 886, 118 Stat. 1418,
1641.
258. H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, at 360 (2004).
259. The NFL’s Largest Trade, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, https://www.profoot
ballhof.com/news/the-nfl-s-largest-trade/ [https://perma.cc/N59Q-MFRX] (last visited Sept.
10, 2019).
260. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962).
261. See id.; see also Dalton, supra note 149, at 181 (“[T]erms of trade are determined
by familiar supply and demand forces, both parties to the transaction seeking to economize
or maximize, to receive the most for what they pay.”).
262. See Croker, supra note 50; see also MLB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
supra note 41, at art. 23 § (C)(2)(b)(iii) (providing guidance for when a MLB team retains
salary obligations in a transferred contract).
263. See, e.g., James C. O’Leary, Red Sox Sell Babe Ruth for $100,000 Cash, BOS.
GLOBE (Jan. 6, 1920), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/1920/01/06/red-sox-sell-babe-
ruth-for-cash/muYGoMdAzCl8WlRHK2LumI/story.html [https://perma.cc/E4RG-
RPCH]; see also MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, THE OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
RULES BOOK § 12(e) (2018), https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/864M-AY5A] [hereinafter OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES
BOOK] (requiring that consideration, including cash, for trades be stated in definite terms).
2019] Taxing Trades 979
salary obligations would not be liable for those obligations if the player
were to breach the terms of the contract, which is not the case with a
simple transfer of money. Further, retaining salary obligations in a trans-
ferred contract impacts that team’s total salary for purposes of the
league’s salary cap.264
When a team exchanges a contract purely for money, the fair market
value of the player contract is the amount of money received.265 None-
theless, such circumstances offer little towards administering current tax
laws because they rarely occur: in 2018, only fifty-seven pure player-for-
money trades occurred across the five professional sports leagues in the
United States.266 In fact, the NHL has banned such transactions,267 and
the NBA limits the yearly aggregate amount of money that a team may
pay or receive in trades to $5.1 million.268 Moreover, leagues flat out pro-
hibit the exchange of cash for future draft picks.269 Further, even when
exchanges involving money do occur, the pre-TCJA manner of taxation
accounts for them because they are not like-kind.270
When a team retains partial liability for a transferred contract’s salary
obligation, the fair market value of that contract is zero. Three reasons
justify this valuation. First, the fair market value is not less than zero be-
cause, in an arms-length transaction, no team would accept a player con-
tract that would cost them money. Second, the fair market value is not
greater than zero because no team would retain salary obligations to pro-
vide the receiving team with a player that is worth more than his salary.
Third, teams are unlikely to retain salary obligations to compensate an-
other team for the difference in value of assets in an exchange. This is
because the receiving team may not receive full payment if they released
the player or if the player breached the terms of that contract. Thus, an
agreement to retain a contract’s salary obligations supplements the other-
wise negatively valued contract, bringing its fair market value to zero.
Again, this offers little to the valuation conundrum because the gain or
loss from the exchange will be zero, meaning that no tax revenue is col-
lected to offset the cost of administration.
264. See, e.g., MLB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 41, at art. 23
§ (C)(2)(b)(iii).
265. See Davis, 370 U.S. at 72.
266. SPOTRAC, MLB Transactions, supra note 54 (MLB teams engaged in 46 player-for-
money trades); SPOTRAC, MLS Transactions, supra note 54 (MLS teams engaged in 9
player-for-money trades); SPOTRAC, NBA Transactions, supra note 54 (NBA teams en-
gaged in 2 player-for-money trades); SPOTRAC, NFL Transactions, supra note 54 (NFL
teams engaged in 0 player-for-money trades); SPOTRAC, NHL Transactions, supra note 54
(NHL teams engaged in 0 player-for-money trades).
267. NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at art. 50,
§§ 50.5(e)(iii), 50.8(b)(ii).
268. NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at art. VII § 8(a).
269. See, e.g., OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK, supra note 263,
§§ 4(k)(3)(A)–(B).
270. See I.R.C. § 1031 (2017); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1 (as amended in 1991).
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B. CURRENT TAX LAWS INVITE TEAMS TO PARTAKE
IN TAX ARBITRAGE
Administrative costs aside, taxing trades between sports teams is likely
to result in less tax revenue being collected than before the TCJA be-
cause of the opportunity for tax arbitrage. Tax arbitrage is a process in
which taxpayers reduce their tax liability without fundamentally changing
their economic position.271 One way taxpayers may partake in tax arbi-
trage is by recognizing the time value of money and exploiting the differ-
ent tax rates associated with ordinary income and capital gains.272
Applying current tax laws to trades allows teams to do just that because
teams may exploit the zero-value safe harbor when it benefits them and
avoid the safe harbor, in favor of tax arbitrage, when it does not.
Since the Code entitles teams to amortize and deduct the basis of
player contracts received in a trade,273 the true net tax affect to teams is
simply that caused by the time value of money.274 These amortization
deductions are meant to offset the cost of obtaining a player contract.275
Accordingly, amortization deductions offset ordinary income, resulting in
tax savings equal to the amount of the deduction multiplied by the tax-
payer’s effective tax rate.276 However, the monopoly that teams have in
contracting with non-free agent players and the salary restrictions unique
to professional sports means that, by engaging in trades of player con-
tracts, teams could obtain a much higher basis in the acquired contract
than their actual out-of-pocket expense. This, combined with the prefer-
ential tax treatment that trades between teams are likely to receive when
the asset is held for more than one year,277 will often result in future tax
savings that have a higher present value than the amount of tax owed
after the trade.
This peculiar result is best illustrated with an example. Suppose that on
January 1st of year one, a team trades a player contract with one year
remaining on its term, an adjusted basis of $0, and a fair market value of
$1,000,000 for another player contract that also has one year remaining
on its term and a fair market value of $1,000,000. Assume also that the
teams obtained the contracts without a signing bonus, making the ordi-
nary income recapture rule embodied in § 1245 inapplicable.278 Before
the TCJA, the net tax effect to the teams would be $0, so long as they
held onto to the acquired contracts for their duration. This is because the
teams would not realize any gain until disposing of the contracts in ex-
271. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 1244.
272. See Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax Benefit of Deferred Compensation, 62
TAX L. REV. 377, 387–88 (2009).
273. Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127.
274. See Erwin, supra note 16, at 54.
275. See Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
276. See I.R.C. § 161 (2017).
277. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. Gain on player contracts held for
more than one year will be taxed at a maximum rate of 23.8% subject to the recapture
rules of § 1245. See supra notes 88–93.
278. See I.R.C. § 1245(a).
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change for non-like-kind property. Also, the teams would not be entitled
to any additional amortization deductions since each teams’ basis in the
acquired contract would be zero.
Following the TCJA, each team would realize and recognize $1,000,000
in gain, resulting in a tax bill of $230,000 for year one, at a preferential tax
rate of 23.8%. Each team could then amortize the entire $1,000,000 basis
of the contract received in year one since that is the life of the contract.
The amortization deduction of $1,000,000 results in $370,000 in tax sav-
ings, at the ordinary income tax rate of 37%. Thus, each team would re-
duce its tax liability by $132,000 for year one without fundamentally
changing its economic position.
The same post-TCJA opportunity for tax arbitrage exists when teams
trade player contracts with over one year remaining on their terms. For
example, suppose a team trades a player contract it obtained without a
signing bonus that has two years remaining on its term, an adjusted basis
of $0, and a fair market value of $2,000,000 for another player contract
that also has two years remaining on the contract and a fair market value
of $2,000,000. Following the TCJA, the team would realize and recognize
$2,000,000 in gain, resulting in a tax bill of $476,000 at a preferential tax
rate of 23.8%. The team could then amortize the $2,000,000 basis of the
contract received over the life of the contract, resulting in two yearly de-
ductions of $1,000,000, and $370,000 in yearly tax savings at the ordinary
income tax rate of 37%. The present value of the future tax savings at a
7% discount rate—the historical stock market rate of return279—is ap-
proximately $668,996. Thus, the team would reduce its tax liability by
$192,996 without fundamentally changing its economic position. Any fu-
ture gain from a sale of the contract would be recaptured as ordinary
income under the principles of § 1245,280 but teams can easily avoid this
result by not engaging in such a transaction for the remainder of the
player contract.
Some tax scholars may argue this opportunity for tax arbitrage is not
any different from that allowed by the increased expensing associated
with § 168(k) and § 179 of the Code.281 This argument does not consider
the unique characteristics of both the professional sports industry and the
intangible assets traded between teams. As mentioned, § 168(k) allows a
100% deduction allowance for the year qualifying property is placed in
service until January 1, 2023.282 This deduction offsets the taxpayer’s ordi-
nary income for the year, resulting in tax savings.283
Unlike player contracts, the property facilitating a § 168(k) or § 179
deduction is likely to still have value beyond the point of the taxpayer’s
279. J.B. Maverick, What Is the Average Annual Return for the S&P 500?, INVES-
TOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042415/what-average-annual-return-
sp-500.asp [https://perma.cc/5AJ3-9XR6] (last updated May 21, 2019).
280. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1).
281. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 255 (2017).
282. I.R.C. § 168(k)(6)(A)(i).
283. See id. § 161.
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basis in the property reaching zero. When this occurs, the owner of
§ 168(k) or § 179 property is likely to realize income from the property in
the form of increased revenue from either using or selling the property.
The entirety of this income will be taxed because there are no deductions
to offset it. Therefore, the taxation of future income realized from the
property should, in most cases, offset the immediate expensing allowed
under § 168(k) or § 179.284 This eventual offset cannot occur with the
large deductions allowed by taxing trades between teams, because a
player contract simply ceases to exist once its term ends.
Moreover, while not every trade will cause the present value of future
tax savings to be greater than the tax liability incurred, teams are likely to
plan accordingly. The zero-value safe harbor presents one notable plan-
ning opportunity.285 In addition, teams may entirely avoid the realization
event necessary to incur taxation. For example, in the MLS, teams may
engage in cross player loans to avoid such a realization event.286 No other
league allows for intra-league loans. However, this could change because
the leagues and player associations are themselves responsible for gov-
erning their teams.
V. TWO OPTIONS FOR RETURNING TO THE PRE-TCJA
MANNER OF TAXATION
Considering the overwhelming administrability issues and the possibil-
ity of decreased revenue associated with taxing trades between teams, a
return to the pre-TCJA manner of taxation is necessary. Affording non-
recognition treatment to trades between teams deviates from taxing the
Haig-Simons definition of income, but three reasons justify the deviation.
First, like the non-taxation of imputed income, frequent flyer miles, and
caught home run baseballs before they are sold, administrative concerns
justify not taxing trades between teams.287 Second, the value of player
contracts and future draft picks will still be taxed when teams convert the
player’s services into revenue.288 Third, while the non-recognition treat-
ment constitutes a tax expenditure favoring professional sports, “[sports
are] good for Americans (who can argue with [that]).”289
284. See Hanna, supra note 94, at 439 (the Cary Brown model “holds that immediately
deducting the cost of an asset is equivalent to excluding from income the future annual
return of the asset”).
285. See Rev. Proc. 2019-18, 2019-18 I.R.B. 1077.
286. See Bradley T. Borden et al., To Repeal or Retain Section 1031: A Tempest in a $6
Billion Teapot, NEWSQUARTERLY, Spring 2015, at 1, 22; see also MLS Roster Rules, supra
note 39, at 15 (providing rules regarding the loaning of players to other teams within the
league).
287. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 104, at 344.
288. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 104 (2015) (the imposition of a tax at the time an exchange of
personal data occurs between companies is not critical because the value of the data will be
taxed when converted to advertising revenue).
289. Selig v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 524, 528 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff’d, 740 F.2d 572,
578 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Tax law may afford non-recognition treatment to trades between teams
in one of two ways. First, Congress may pass legislation affording non-
recognition treatment to the trading of intangible assets that involve the
right to services from players. Second, the Treasury Department, either
through its regulations or through the IRS, may reach the same result
through reliance on the open-transaction doctrine. Notably, even if Con-
gress were to return the taxation of trades between teams to the pre-
TCJA manner through legislation, the Treasury would still need to ac-
count for the hundreds of trades that took place in 2018.290
A. THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
Congress may return the taxing of trades between sports teams to the
pre-TCJA manner of taxation by modeling legislation after a recently
proposed bill that aims to afford non-recognition treatment to exchanges
of virtual currency.291 Specifically, Congress may add a special rule to
§ 1031 stating that all intangible assets involving the right to receive pre-
sent or future services from players shall be treated as like-kind property
for purposes of the section.292 Such a revision will bring player contracts,
future draft picks, and other similar assets within § 1031, facilitating a
return to the pre-TCJA manner of taxation.
B. THROUGH RELIANCE ON THE OPEN-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE
The Treasury may afford non-recognition treatment to trades between
teams, without congressional intervention, by relying on the open-trans-
action doctrine. As a general rule, the Treasury, both in its regulations
and through the IRS, demands that the fair market value of an asset re-
ceived in an exchange be determined except in “rare and extraordinary”
circumstances.293 Current tax laws account for those circumstances with
the open-transaction doctrine.294 Thus, the Treasury may facilitate a re-
turn to the pre-TCJA manner of taxation by declaring that the trading of
intangible assets involving the right to receive present or future services
from players constitutes a “rare and extraordinary” circumstance.295
Under the open-transaction doctrine, transactions involving assets with
no ascertainable fair market value are held open “until they are sold . . .
or otherwise reduced to money or property of ascertainable value.”296
The taxpayer’s basis in the asset transferred becomes the basis in the
290. See sources cited supra note 54.
291. See H.R. 7361, 115th Cong. (2018).
292. See id.
293. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 2017); Rev. Rule 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
294. Thimmesch, supra note 185, at 177 n.162.
295. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 2017); Rev. Rule 58-402, 1958-2 C.B.
15.
296. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ES-
TATES AND GIFTS ¶ 93.5.3 (2018). For examples of cases allowing and disallowing the open-
transaction doctrine, see id. at n.19.
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property received.297 A taxpayer will have an amount realized, to the ex-
tent that money or property with an ascertainable fair market value is
received in the exchange. Further, any property or money received on a
subsequent disposition of the asset will be tax free until the taxpayer re-
covers the asset’s basis.298 Thus, the doctrine results in the same tax con-
sequences as § 1031.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress dropped the ball when limiting like-kind tax
treatment to real property without considering the trading of intangible
assets that frequently occurs between sports teams. The Treasury Depart-
ment has exacerbated the issue by creating a safe harbor permitting
teams to treat player contracts and future draft picks as having a zero
value for tax purposes without releasing any guidance addressing how
valuations are to occur when teams avoid the safe harbor.299 Neverthe-
less, to quote one of the winningest college football coaches, “The great-
est mistake of all is to continue practicing a mistake.”300 Thus, Congress
or the Treasury should return the taxation of trades between teams to the
pre-TCJA manner of taxation.
Current tax laws require that IRS agents step into the shoes of profes-
sional scouts to ensure teams are assigning accurate values to the intangi-
ble assets involved in trades whenever teams avoid the zero-value safe
harbor. Even with advanced valuation methodologies such as Moneyball,
this requirement presents an insurmountable administration burden. As
professional scouts, general managers, and even courts will tell you, as-
signing a fair market value to a player contract or future draft pick with
any accuracy is generally impossible.301 Indeed, Congress has scrapped
other tax laws that required IRS agents to engage in the player valuation
conundrum on grounds that administering the law resulted in an unpro-
ductive waste of taxpayer and government resources.302
Furthermore, a return to the pre-TCJA manner of taxing trades be-
tween teams is necessary to preserve tax revenue. Together, the monop-
oly that teams have on non-free agent players contracts, salary
restrictions, preferential tax treatment, and potentially large amortization
deductions allow teams to drastically reduce their tax liability without
fundamentally changing their economic position. Teams will likely exploit
this opportunity for tax arbitrage whenever possible. When it is not,
teams are likely to plan accordingly. For example, teams may make ef-
297. Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 188–89 (1954).
298. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 296, at ¶ 93.5.3.
299. See Rev. Proc. 2019-18, 2019-18 I.R.B. 1077 § 1.
300. BOBBY BOWDEN, THE BOWDEN WAY: 50 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP WISDOM 249
(2002).
301. See, e.g., Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1241 (5th Cir. 1977); DICKSON,
supra note 5, at 263; Tankersley, supra note 16.
302. See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 886, 118 Stat.
1418, 1641.
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forts to minimize—or perhaps avoid—taxes by utilizing the zero-value
safe harbor or by engaging in intra-league player loans, such as those cur-
rently allowed in the MLS.303
While there is an apparent need to return to a pre-TCJA manner of
taxing trades between teams, doing so through congressional legislation
may be difficult because of the current political climate.304 Democratic
members of Congress may be less than eager to correct mistakes in a
largely Republican tax act.305 Still, if sports alone cannot bring Demo-
crats and Republicans together, this article provides both Congress and
the Treasury with the justification and legal basis for returning to the pre-
TCJA manner of taxation.
303. See MLS Roster Rules, supra note 39, at 15.
304. See Evan M. Migdail & Melissa Gierach, Prospects for Tax Policy in a Divided




986 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
